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The drowning of 800 migrants, 19 April 2015, after the capsizing of a 
smuggling boat, triggered responses from across Europe. But when 
EU leaders met four days later, the news-cycle had moved on and 
the European Council, 23 April, gave a disappointing response. The 
28 agreed to scale up their joint search-and-rescue efforts at sea to 
the more substantial efforts of what Italy has achieved alone in the 
last year. There were, also, a   handful of other minor actions. Mr 
Junker, President of the Commission, lamented that the EU should 
be more ambitious. He was right, in as much as the EU meeting 
will not sustainably curb the deadly trends we have seen in the 
Mediterranean in recent years.
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growing and growing dramatically. From 1998-
2013, an average 44,000 people were smuggled and 
recorded annually. In 2014, the number jumped 
to almost 220,000 and in the first three and a half 
months of 2015, close to 40,000 entries by sea have 
already been recorded (figure 1). 
The numbers crossing have been growing and, of 
course, the deaths. In the period 1988-2015, 18,403 
people died while trying to reach European coasts. 
Half of them (44.9%) were recorded in the last five 
years – i.e. after 2011 – whereas – the highest peaks 
are observed in 2014 (3279) and 2015 (1719 in only 
four months) (figure 2). In addition, an unknown 
number of migrants died in the Mediterranean 
without being noticed: their bodies did not turn up 
in European jurisdictions.
So, what are the facts? 
Dangerous, irregular migration to Europe across 
the Mediterranean has been endemic for at least 25 
years. No one in the Italian ports of Brindisi and 
Bari can, for example, forget the two huge ferries 
disembarking close to 50,000 people fleeing chaos 
in the People’s Republic of Albania. That was in the 
summer of 1991. Routine records of irregular entries 
by sea started later, in 1998. At the time of writing 
(end of April 2015) 922,971 clandestine migrants 
have been recorded, to which one must add the 
unknown but probably high number of migrants 
who were not recorded at entry because they were 
smuggled successfully into the EU. 
In conjunction with mounting waves of refugees 
from the Middle East and the Horn of Africa and 
with political chaos in Libya, numbers have been 
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Fig. 1:Migrants smuggled by sea to the EU 1998-2015 (as of 20/04)
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Not only the number of deaths, but also the prob-
ability of dying during the journey has significantly 
increased in recent years. From 7.6 ‰ between 1998 
and 2004, it peaked at 20.5‰, 2005-2014, to reach 
45‰ in the first four months of 2015 (figure 3).
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data retrieved from Fortress Europe (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/) for
the period 1/1/1998-31/12/2013, from IOM (http://missingmigrants.iom.int/incidents) for the period 1/1/2014
13/04/2015 and from various newspaper articles for the period 14/4/2015-19/4/2015
Fig. 2: Dead and missing persons on maritime routes of irregular migration to the EU 
1988-2015 (as of 19/04)
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Fig. 4: Probability of dying at sea on maritime routes of irregular migration to Italy by 
month (per 1,000 persons), 2011-2015 (as of 19/04)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data on dead at sea retrieved from Fortress Europe (http://fortresseurope.
blogspot.it/) for 1/1/2011-31/12/2013, from IOM (http://missingmigrants.iom.int/incidents) for 1/1/2014-
13/04/2015 and from various newspaper articles for 14/4/2015-19/4/2015 and on data on migrants smuggled at sea 
retrieved from the Italian Ministry of Interior.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data on dead at sea retrieved from Fortress Europe (http://fortresseurop blogspot.it/) for 
the period 1/1/1998-31/12/2013, from IOM (http://missingmigrants.iom.int/incidents) for the period 1/1/2014-13/04/2015 
and from various newspaper articles for the period 14/4/2015-19/4/2015 and on data on migrants smuggled at sea retrieved-
from Italy: Ministry of Interior; Spain: Ministry of Interior for 1999-2013 and UNHCR for 2014 and 2015; Malta:
Frontexwatch for 2008-2013 and UNHCR for 2014 and 2015; Greece: Hellenic 
Police, Ministry of Public Order & Citizen Protection for 2009-2013 and UNHCR for 2014 and 2015.
Fig. 3: Probability of dying at sea on maritime routes to EU, (per 1,000 persons), 1998-2015 
(as of 19/04)
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Italian data allows us to pick out a seasonal trend in 
mortality. Clear peaks appear in the first months of 
the year, as well as in autumn (figure 4). Increased 
risks of dying at sea are the result of a combination 
of factors. Routes used by smugglers have become 
longer, and therefore more dangerous. Both points 
of embarkation and disembarkation have been 
moving all the time, the former with the changing 
geography of conflicts displacing people, and the 
latter with increased controls at destination and the 
smugglers’ strategy of bypassing controls. The old 
maritime routes across the Strait of Gibraltar (seven 
miles wide)  or the Strait of Otranto (80-miles) were 
less perilous than the new routes from Libya to Sicily 
(300 or more miles) or even from Egypt or Turkey 
to Italy (ca. 1500 miles). With the shift by the Italian 
navy from border control interventions to search and 
rescue missions in the framework of Mare Nostrum 
in October 2013, smugglers seem to have adopted 
a new  strategy of deliberately meeting, instead of 
bypassing controls, which can reduce mortality. But, 
with demand growing, boats are increasingly rusty 
and overloaded and smugglers unscrupulous. The 
result? A soaring number of deaths. 
What to expect in 2015? If differences observed 
between January-April 2014 and January-April  2015 
were to continue through December 2015, in terms 
of crossings and deaths at sea, the total number of 
people arriving by sea in 2015 would be 152,872 
compared with 170,099 in 2014.  If mortality was 
to stay at the level recorded in January-April 2015, 
taking into account too seasonal variations, the 
total number of people drowned during the journey 
would be 9,867 during 2015 compared with 3,120 in 
2014. In brief, arrivals are expected to decrease in 
2015 but mortality to dramatically increase.
Data recorded by the Italian authorities do not 
allow us to easily disentangle the difference between 
forced and voluntary migrants, i.e. between refu-
gees in need of international protection and people 
simply searching for a better life. Their distribution 
by nationality gives some indications, however. The 
vast majority of people smuggled by sea to Italy come 
from what we might call ‘refugee’ countries (Table 
1).  There are strong reasons to think that most of 
those from Syria, Eritrea, Somalia and Palestine are 
genuine refugees in need of protection. 
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How is Europe responding?
In its 23 April meeting, the European Council 
committed itself to at least tripling the budget of the 
EU sea operations, Triton and Poseidon, from 2.9 
to 9 million euros monthly: Triton and Poseidon 
are aimed at controlling irregular migration flows 
towards the EU and tackling cross-border crime 
in, respectively, the central and eastern Mediterra-
nean The objective is to increase search and rescue; 
to fight traffickers by disrupting their networks, 
destroying their vessels and removing the internet 
content they use to attract migrants and refugees; 
and more generally to preventing illegal migration 
flows (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meet-
ings/european-council/2015/04/23/). In the longer 
term, the EU will support UN-led efforts to restore 
the government in Libya and to bring back peace in 
Syria.
Providing EU operations at sea with financial 
resources equivalent to those put in place by Italy  last 
year could in principle save lives. But we cannot be 
certain that Mare Nostrum actually reduced the risk 
of dying at sea (see Figure 4).  Also, the area covered 
by Triton and Poseidon (the entire Mediterranean) 
extends well beyond the waters Mare Nostrum was 
watching over (the Central Mediterranean), and one 
might fear that more diluted resources will be less 
efficient. In addition, increasing “search and rescue” 
operations “within the mandate of Frontex” seems 
a rather ambiguous objective. As noted by Fabrice 
Leggeri, Executive Director of Frontex, “we cannot 
have provisions for proactive search-and-rescue 
action. This is not in Frontex’s mandate, and this is in 
my understanding not in the mandate of the Euro-
pean Union”1 . Accordingly, unlike Mare Nostrum, 
1 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/22/eu-borders-
chief-says-saving-migrants-lives-cannot-be-priority-for-
patrols, retrieved 24 April, 2015.
Tab. 1: Migrants smuggled at sea in Italy 2012-2015 (as of 20/04) by declared nationality 
Top ten nationalities
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior
Nationality 2012 2013 2014 2015 (Jan 1-Apr 20) Total
Syria  580 11,307 41,941 1,596 55,424
Eritrea 1,428 9,834 33,451 3,248 47,961
Somalia 2,179 3,263 5,644 2,566 13,652
Nigeria 358 2,680 8,570 1,991 13,599
Gambia 348 2,619 8,159 1,810 12,936
Mali 218 1,675 9,314 1,279 12,486
Egypt 1,221 2,728 4,091 47 8,087
Senegal 48 1,314 4,652 1,586 7,600
Palestine 37 1,075 6,024 384 7,520
Pakistan 1,238 1,753 3,678 513 7,182
Top ten 
nationalities 7,655 38,248 125,524 15,020 186,447
Total nationalities 13,267 42,925 170,099 23,943 250,234
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Triton and Poseidon are likely to be destined to 
“protect borders” rather than to “save lives”.
Moreover, fighting the smugglers should reduce, in 
the first instance, mortality at sea. If they smuggle 
fewer migrants, the number of deaths will be lower, 
unless the risk of each crossing increases. But, 
reducing the number of people dying at sea may 
mean collateral risks. The first one is that new smug-
glers rapidly replace neutralised smugglers. The 
new routes will be, if recent history is anything to 
go by, longer and more dangerous than the ones 
just neutralised. The second risk is that blocking the 
mobility of those who need to move will aggravate 
their plight in Libya and in other transit countries. 
There are many accounts of refugees and migrants 
suffering abuse in Libya, including life-threatening 
conditions. Trapping them in that most unsafe 
country would amount to denying them their right 
to protection. 
Removing the smugglers can work only if it is 
accompanied with alternatives: we must remember 
that in many cases these smugglers are the only way 
for refugees to actually claim international protec-
tion. Creating safe corridors between conflict areas 
and Europe has become a must. Moreover, the last 
segment of the journey could be secured as during 
the Libyan war, when humanitarian ferries evacu-
ated thousand of migrants from Misrata to Bengazi, 
avoiding sea mines, constant fire, etc. Humanitarian 
corridors are, it should be noted, cheaper than sea 
rescue operations. 
The European council reiterates the EU’s commit-
ment to implementing readmission agreements 
with third countries and announces a new return 
programme for the rapid return of illegal migrants. 
However, the statement of the European Council 
says nothing about a commitment to do more in 
asylum terms. Accordingly, opening new channels 
of legal entry for asylum seekers by guaranteeing 
them the possibility of humanitarian visas to the EU 
in their countries of origin or in third neighbouring 
countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Sudan, 
etc.) might be an important part of the solution. 
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